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1. Recent Trends in FDI in Japan 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Japan (i. 
e., direct investment by foreign companies) be-
gan to increase in the latter half  of  1990 s, in-
creasing particularly rapidly since the 1998 fiscal 
year. FDI in 1999 was 2, 399. 3 billion yen, a 
79% increase over the previous year and a new 
all-time high. FDI exceeded 1 trillion yen for two 
consecutive years, in 1998 and 1999. (See Table 
1.)
 On a flow basis, the imbalance between Ja-
pan's outward and inward FDI has decreased as 
indicated by the ratio between the two, said ra-
tio being 3.9 in 1998 and 3.1 in 1999. Prior to
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Table 1. Changes in the ratio between Japan's outward and inward FDI
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this, the imbalance between FDI from Japan 
and FDI in Japan had created investment fric-
tion : Large FDI from Japan contrasting with 
small FDI in Japan had been criticized as evi-
dence of the closed nature of Japan's investment 
market. 
 On a stock basis, the ratio of outward FDI to 
inward FDI in other major industrialized na-
tions is in imbalance but much closer to parity : 
1.1 in the U. S. (CY 1997) , 1.5 in the UK (CY 
1998) , 2.5 in Germany (CY 1995) , and 1.1 in 
France (CY 1996) . In contrast, the same ratio in 
Japan is 10.3 (CY 1998) , indicating a large im-
balance, although the ratio has begun to change 
recently. 
 Next, let us consider FDI trends in the manu-
facturing and non-manufacturing industries. (See 
Table 2.) 
 The foreign capital penetration ratio of the 
non-manufacturing sector has traditionally ex-
ceeded that of the manufacturing industry. For 
example, those ratios were 77% (non-manufac-
turing) versus 23% (manufacturing) in 1998 
and 59% versus 41% in 1999. 
ard  rd I (flow basis) 
(Unit : Hundred million yen) .
FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999
Outward FDI  44,313 41, 514 42,808 49, 568 54,094 66, 229 52,169 74,390
Inward FDI 5,306 3,586 4,327 3,697 7,707 6, 782 13,404 23,993
Ratio of outward to inward FDI 8.4 11.6 9.9 13.4 7.0 9.8 3.9 3.1
 Source  : Ministry of Finance (reported inward and outward FDI) .
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          Table 2. Inward FDI by industry 
(Unit : Hundred million yen) .
FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999
Machine 829 781  1,339 182 1, 558 1,452 2, 129 8,652
Chemistry 931 542 234 1,095 695 740 397 603
Others 321 513 481 135 858 482 600 542
Manufacturing industry total 2, 081 1,836 2,054 1,412 3, 111 2,674 3, 126 9, 797
Trade industry 1, 554 1,005 1, 135 679 1, 664 996 1,759 3,485
Service industry 1,067 240 374 491 2,360 888 3, 181 2,058
Finance and insurance 190 40 687 1,001 273 1, 616 4, 569 5, 115
Others 414 40 77 113 298 608 769 3,538
Non-manufacturing industry total 3, 225 1,325 2, 273 2,284 4, 595 4,108 10,278 14,196
 Source  : Ministry of Finance (reported inward FDI) . 
  As evinced by French auto maker Renault's 
investment in, and participation in the manage-
ment of, Nissan Motor Corp., the transport ma-
chine sector accounts for a large portion of in-
ward FDI in the manufacturing industry. 
  In the non-manufacturing industry , invest-
ments in the finance and insurance industry and 
the telecommunications industry are conspicu-
ous. Investments in the service industry, as well 
as commercial and trade-related investments in-
tended to increase exports to Japan, continue to 
account for the same share as before. 
 By industry, foreign penetration has increased 
in industries where accelerated restructuring is 
underway. 
  Based on present conditions as discussed 
above, this paper will consider Japanese foreign 
capital policy and then examine the causes of 
the current surge in inward FDI. 
2. Japanese Foreign Capital Policy : From 
 Regulation to Attraction 
 Recent years have seen a rapid increase in 
the investment of foreign capital in the Japanese
market. 
 Although the foreign capital policy of postwar 
Japan has gradually moved toward the liberali-
zation of capital transactions, culminating in al-
most complete liberalization in the 1980s, in ac-
tuality , various regulations and barriers re-
mained, making entry into the Japanese market 
by foreign capital difficult. In the 1990s, how-
ever, the Japanese government changed its pol-
icy so as to actively invite foreign capital. Let us 
consider the causes of that change by surveying 
policy since World War II. 
 2.1 The Age of Regulation 
 The cornerstones of the foreign capital policy 
of postwar Japan have been the Foreign Ex-
change and Trade Management Law and the 
Foreign Capital Law, both of which were prom-
ulgated in December 1949. The basic policies 
that these laws embodied were " regulation in 
principle" and "exceptional freedom. " 
 The Foreign Capital Law set forth the public 
position of the protection of foreign capital that 
would further the economic development of Ja-
pan. In actual practice, however, the entry of
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foreign capital was subject to extreme regula-
tion because of fears of foreign control of domes-
tic industries. By means of industrial policy, the 
government instead sought to promote domestic 
industry using domestic capital and enterprise, 
without depending on foreign capital. 
  Foreign capital was borrowed in the form of 
loans, and foreign technology was actively intro-
duced. Strong nationalistic tendencies saw for-
eign capital as a form of colonization. Japanese 
capital and enterprise , fearing foreign domi-
nance of Japanese companies, minimized foreign 
participation in management and sought to form 
a national economy. 
 2.2 The Progression of liberalization 
  The liberalization of trade and capital in Ja-
pan dates back to a June 1960 Cabinet decision 
entitled, "General Rules of the Trade and Ex-
change Liberalization Plan. " The liberalization 
of trade began first, with the liberalization of 
capital gaining momentum subsequently, in the 
late 1960 s. A major turning point in the liberali-
zation of capital was Japan's 1964 entry into the 
OECD. 
  After the first phase of capital liberalization in 
June 1967,  four additional phases were imple-
mented : the second in 1969,  the third in 1970,  
the fourth in 1971, and the fifth in 1973. The fifth 
phase of liberalization effected a shift in policy 
from prohibition to" freedom in principle." How-
ever , this liberalization granted exceptional 
status to certain industries (i . e., petroleum , 
leather goods, and agriculture, forestry, and fish-
eries) and provided deferred liberalization for 
17 industries (e.g., computers and medical sup-
plies) . 
  The gradual liberalization that Japan pursued 
was not proactive liberalization, but rather an 
attempt to delay liberalization as much as possi-
ble. Only when absolutely necessary were mar-
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kets opened-beginning with only those indus-
tries thought to have sufficient international 
competitiveness to withstand the onslaught of 
foreign capital. 
 In keeping with this trend toward the liberali-
zation of trade and capital , the Foreign Ex-
change and Trade Management Law was 
amended in 1980, replacing the policies of regu-
lation in principle and exceptional freedom with 
the completely opposite policies of freedom in 
principle and exceptional regulation. 
 2.3 The Promotion of Imports and the 
     Penetration of Foreign Capital 
  In the 1970s, Japan's trade surplus began to 
grow , intensifying trade friction with other 
countries. In the 1980s, Japan's trade surplus 
grew further as the yen appreciated. This led to 
increasingly strong demands from the West for 
market opening and the promotion of imports. 
 The late 1980s saw the further intensification 
of trade friction. Solutions to Japan's huge trade 
surplus were demanded, and pressure for the 
opening of markets increased. In response, the 
Japanese government implemented import pro-
motion policy. 
  The avoidance of trade friction and the pro-
motion of imports also facilitated the entry of 
foreign capital into Japan. Although foreign in-
vestors took an active stance to investment in 
Japan's huge markets , the Japanese govern-
ment's foreign capital policy was rather passive, 
welcoming foreign capital only to the extent 
needed to promote imports and ease trade fric-
tion. 
  Japanese companies invested actively in for-
eign countries to assuage trade friction and to 
take advantage of the strong yen, creating a 
" b
ubble" economy in Japan and initiating the 
hollowing-out of Japanese industry. In contrast, 
foreign companies' entry into the Japanese mar-
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ket failed to progress much, and the imbalance 
between outward FDI and inward FDI engen-
dered investment friction. 
 Legally, the liberalization of capital transac-
tions moved ahead, but the introduction of for-
eign capital was, in actuality, made difficult by 
numerous "invisible" regulations, such as those 
governing the cross-holding of shares. 
  At that time, Japan's marketing channels, 
business practices, keiretsu (associations of cor-
porations) , and other factors were cited as prob-
lems by the U.S. in trade negotiations with Ja-
pan. Amendment of the Large Store Law made 
it easier for companies such as Toys "R" Us to 
enter Japan's distribution industry, whereas ac-
quisition of auto parts manufacturer Koito by T. 
Boone Pickens failed because of strong opposi-
tion by the keiretsu to which Koito belonged. 
 2.4 Policies to Attract Foreign Capital : 
    Opening of the Japanese Investment 
     Market 
 It was the economic recession of the 1990s— 
triggered by the bubble economy's collapse , 
massive sums of bad debt, and the hollowing 
out of industry—that made Japan aware of the 
important role of the foreign capital in the Japa-
nese economy. Japan saw the speculative bub-
ble burst in 1990s, after having enjoyed lavish 
prosperity in the 1980s. The large sums of bad 
debt that came to light were a problem that 
was difficult to resolve and which made the fi-
nancial system unstable. A particularly severe 
blow was dealt to the Japanese economy by the 
abolition of the special tax reduction, in April 
1997, and by an increase in the consumption tax. 
An economic recession took root, forcing compa-
nies to restructure. 
 In contrast, economic expansion began in the 
United States after March 1991. Deregulation 
and the resultant introduction of competition, as
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well as growth in the Internet and other infor-
mation technologies, revitalized the private sec-
tor. The reversal of the Japanese and American 
economies became clear in 1995 : U. S. -Japan 
trade friction decreased after tentative agree-
ments were reached in automobile and auto-
part negotiations in 1995 and in semiconductor 
negotiations in 1996. 
 It was at this turning point in the Japanese 
economy that Japan's foreign capital policy 
transformed into one emphasizing the attraction 
of foreign capital. 
 In 1990, the government announced a policy 
of welcoming FDI in Japan, and liberalization 
began. Foreign Access Zones (FAZs) were es-
tablished and investment procedures were sim-
plified under the Import Promotion and FDI in 
Japan Law, enacted in 1992, and under revisions 
of related laws. In the fall of 1994, the Confer-
ence on Foreign Investment, chaired by the 
prime minister, was established-one example of 
the new status of FDI promotion as a basic pol-
icy of the Japanese government. This proactive 
stance toward FDI signified a policy shift to for-
eign capital attraction for the first time in Ja-
pan's history. The opening of investment mar-
kets proceeded gradually, although progress in 
such areas as deregulation was slow and invest-
ment conditions could not yet be called ade-
quate. 
 Japan's Foreign Exchange and Trade Man-
agement Law was amended again in 1997, re-
moving the word " management " from the 
name of the law. This amendment went into ef-
fect in April 1998 as part of Japan's financial 
"Bi
g Bang. " The complete liberalization of for-
eign exchange was effected with the abolish-
ment of such regulations as the requirement of 
prior reporting to the government for capital 
transactions and foreign payments. This was fol-
lowed, in December 1998, by the Financial Sys-
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tern Reform Law, which deregulated the direct 
sale of investment trusts (i. e., mutual funds) 
by banks and effected the switchover to a sys-
tem of registration in principle for securities 
companies. 
  Japan's financial Big Bang was a series of 
measures designed to respond to economic 
globalization by ultimately effecting structural 
reform of the Japanese economy. This reform 
greatly accelerated the influx of foreign capital 
into Japan. Especially prominent were cases in 
which foreign capital helped Japanese banks 
that had been struggling under the weight of 
bad debt. 
 April 1999 saw the Conference on Foreign In-
vestment issue a statement entitled, " Acquiring 
Various Wisdom Through Foreign Investment 
in Japan , " reflecting the government's proac-
tive posture toward inward FDI. Under the 
joint auspices of the U. S. Department of State, 
the Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try, and JETRO, a symposium (" FDI to Japan 
Symposium 2000" ) was held in March 2000 to 
consider the problems facing the promotion of 
FDI in Japan. 
3. The Need to Attract FDI in Japan 
  As described above, the significance of at-
tracting foreign capital to Japan has changed 
with the times. 
  First, the entry of foreign capital into Japan 
was part of import promotion efforts and was 
significant in that it meshed with the export 
promotion policies of the advanced nations, es-
pecially the United States. However, this signifi-
cance changed when the inflated-assets bubble 
burst. 
  Now, with a revitalized U. S. economy enjoy-
ing a prolonged expansion, massive U. S. capital, 
made highly competitive by information technol-
--- 
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ogy, is advancing with the aim of world con-
quest. It is the age of economic globalization. 
 Japan, in contrast, faces the opposite situation. 
Mired in recession, the nation debates how to 
regenerate the economy. The needed deregula-
tion and structural reform not only were pre-
requisites for economic regeneration, but also 
opened the door to the inflow of foreign capital 
into Japan. 
  The paramount concern of Japanese compa-
nies is restructuring, the ultimate goal of which 
is to reorganize unprofitable operations but which 
today is being implemented chiefly through lay-
offs and the elimination of excessive equipment. 
Amid this downsizing of Japanese companies, 
FDI in Japan is a major factor in the revitaliza-
tion of the Japanese economy. 
  Attracting foreign capital is indispensable for 
economic growth and job creation not only in 
developing nations but in advanced nations, as 
well. Therefore, deregulation and infrastructure 
improvement are necessary, as are effective in-
centives for attracting foreign capital. 
 In addition to competitiveness-promoting meas-
ures, deregulation, and information technology, 
another factor behind continuing economic ex-
pansion in the United States is the country's 
considerable openness and proactiveness toward 
foreign capital. As it attracts and actively ac-
cepts foreign capital, the United States is also in-
vesting in foreign countries. 
  This is an age for countries to open their mar-
kets and for businesses to expand globally. Japa-
nese companies have also actively invested 
abroad, and now—like it or not—the time has 
come for foreign capital to invade Japan. 
  Japan must accept foreign capital proactively, 
not reluctantly in response to external pressure, 
and must acquire foreign technology, manage-
rial know-how, and other knowledge to streng-
then the country's competitiveness. FDI in Ja-
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pan revitalizes the Japanese economy and Japa-
nese markets by creating jobs and transferring 
technology and managerial resources, and can 
prevent the hollowing-out of industry. 
 Cooperation with foreign capital is necessary 
to ensure the survival of weakened Japanese 
companies by incubating new industries and re-
building existing ones. Taking advantage of the 
managerial resources of foreign capital , they 
must acquire the strength needed to prosper 
amid global competition. For example, the re-
structuring of Mazda is being guided by a CEO 
sent from Ford, and Nissan formed an alliance 
with France's Renault. These Japanese compa-
nies are striving to boost their international 
competitiveness and ensure their very survival 
with the help of foreign capital. 
 In the fields of finance and information tech-
nology, which have been protected by the gov-
ernment, foreign capital is expected to revitalize 
and open markets by bringing in new products, 
planning capabilities, and managerial know-how, 
for instance. Companies are compelled to adopt 
international management systems if they are 
to compete in the international marketplace . 
Management must be rationalized and made 
more efficient and must place greater emphasis 
on shareholder value. 
 Reliance on outside capital can also be seen as 
a way for Japan's economy and Japanese indus-
try to find solutions when the nation lacks the 
internal vitality needed to overcome the turmoil 
it faces. In other words, external pressure can 
generate the power to reform. When the U.S. 
automobile industry was in dire straits, invest-
ments from the Japanese automobile industry 
helped greatly : The managerial know-how and 
production technology of the Japanese automo-
bile industry had a demonstration effect and 
contributed greatly to the reconstruction of the 
American auto industry.
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 Japan must now introduce foreign capital ac-
tively. High income levels make the Japanese 
market an attractive one to foreign capital. Fur-
ther, FDI in Japan can exert a positive influence 
on Japanese-style management , which faces 
deepening confusion, and can directly enable the 
transfer of managerial resources. FDI is also ef-
fective in creating jobs. 
 The Japanese government should promote de-
regulation to attract foreign capital and should 
actively utilize foreign capital to reorganize 
businesses and revitalize provincial areas. This 
does not mean dependence on foreign capital, 
but rather the active use of foreign capital. 
 Although the need to accept foreign capital is 
widely recognized and the necessary legal changes 
are being made as described above, it is another 
issue altogether whether foreign capital actually 
enters the Japanese market or not . Foreign 
capital will come only if the Japanese market is 
seen as sufficiently appealing.
4. Factors in the Increase in Foreign 
 tal
Capi-
 Previously , the Japanese business environ-
ment was not attractive to foreign capital, de-
spite Japan's large markets. High business costs, 
such as land, office space, personnel, and com-
munications, had a negative impact on invest-
ment efficiency. 
 Government regulation was considerable, and 
closed business relations, such as the keiretsu, 
were strong, making entry into the Japanese 
market difficult. Then why did FDI in Japan be-
gin to increase? 
  An October 1998 survey by JETRO asked 
why the Japanese market was appealing. The 
most common response was "Market scale and 
growth potential. " The second most-cited rea-
son for entering the Japanese market was "The
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ability to sell expensive, high-functionality, high-
quality goods. " In other words, Japan is the 
kind of mature , consumption-oriented society 
typical of advanced nations, with a huge market 
and considerable purchasing power. Other com-
mon responses were , in descending order , 
"Th e high level of technology, —The good qual-
ity of manpower, " " Access to other Asian coun-
tries, " and "A well-equipped infrastructure. " 
  In addition, many changes conducive to for-
eign capital entry have also occurred. Since the 
collapse of the bubble economy, Japan has had 
to restructure its economy by resolving bad 
loans, reorganizing unprofitable operations, and 
selling off unprofitable subsidiaries, for instance. 
This has also meant a reevaluation of Japanese 
managerial style and business customs, such as 
the cross-holding of shares, the main bank sys-
tem, keiretsu, lifetime employment, and the sen-
iority system. The end of the lifetime employ-
ment system, for instance, has made it easier for 
foreign capital to employ talented people. 
  The Japanese recession brought down land 
prices and stock prices, making both more af-
fordable. Progress was made in deregulation. 
Provincial areas began to recognize the impor-
tance of attracting foreign capital to ensure revi-
talization and job creation. 
  Mergers and acquisitions, which previously 
had suffered a negative image in Japan, became 
an important method of investment as it was 
now imperative for Japanese industry to re-
structure by selling off unprofitable businesses 
and to enter new fields made accessible to them 
by deregulation. In addition to acquisitions of 
Japanese companies by foreign firms, acquisi-
tions by Japanese companies of other Japanese 
companies and even foreign companies have 
also become more common. 
  A survey by Daiwa Securities of official news-
paper announcements sheds light on Japanese
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mergers and acquisitions in 1999 : The number 
of deals was 982, a 28. 7% increase over the pre-
vious year. Of these, the 442 deals for which the 
amount of money was officially announced to-
taled approximately 6. 048 trillion yen—a 164. 6% 
increase over the previous year. Both the num-
ber of deals and the amounts of money involved 
have increased sharply. 
  M & A between Japanese firms account for 
64. 1% of all deals but only 16. 8% in terms of 
amount of money. Japanese companies are ac-
tively pursuing M&A as a means of restructur-
ing by selling off unprofitable operations, for in-
stance. As a result, the cross-holding of shares, 
once a popular method of corporate alliance, is 
beginning to fade. M&A in the Internet sector 
has also begun. 
  Acquisitions of foreign companies by Japanese 
firms account for 21. 9% of the total by number 
of transactions and 34. 2% by amount of money. 
A major transaction of this type is the acquisi-
tion by Japan Tobacco of the overseas cigarette 
operations of RJR Nabisco. 
  Foreign firms' acquisitions of Japanese compa-
nies account for 14. 0% of all M&A activity by 
number of transactions but 49. 0% by amount of 
money. Major acquisitions include the transfer 
of Japan Lease's leasing operations to GE Capi-
tal, Renault's capital participation in Nissan, and 
the capital participation in Japan Telecom by 
British Telecom and AT & T . Through such 
transactions, foreign capital can take advantage 
of local sales networks and business assets. 
  Although foreign capital was once viewed as 
negative, it has begun to acquire a positive im-
age as holding the potential for development 
and providing access to advanced technology 
and planning abilities. More and more university 
students are getting jobs with foreign-owned 
companies, the business environment is improv-
ing, and M&A is a more viable tool for foreign
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capital. 
  Japanese companies are not so much pas-
sively receiving foreign capital as they are ac-
tively seeking out foreign capital as a means of 
effecting their own regeneration and revitaliza-
tion. 
  Nissan Motor Corp. staked its survival on an 
alliance with foreign capital, receiving an invest-
ment of 640 billion yen from French Renault 
and even entrusting Nissan's management to a 
French CEO sent by Renault. Mazda, Mitsub-
ishi, and other Japanese auto makers are also 
under the umbrella of foreign capital, leaving 
only Toyota and Honda without such relation-
ships. 
  The automobile industry is also working to 
develop fuel cells and other environmental tech-
nologies that require massive R & D expendi-
tures. For this reason, and in response to global 
competition, the industry must effect reorgani-
zation and cut costs considerably. 
  The finance and insurance industries in Japan, 
having been closely protected by the govern-
ment, are weak in terms of international com-
petitiveness and must also settle bad loans that 
are a legacy of the bubble economy. On the 
other hand, Japan has massive sums of individ-
ual financial assets–amounting to about 1, 400 
trillion yen–and so is quite enticing to foreign 
capital wishing to manage those assets. 
 Japan's financial world has been reformed un-
der the so-called "Big Bang, " a series of liber-
alization measures that include the aforemen-
tioned April 1998 revision of the Foreign Ex-
change and Trade Management Law. With Ja-
pan's massive pool of individual financial assets 
making it easy for foreign capital to enter the 
Japanese market, joint ventures and alliances 
with Japanese banks were formed in such spe-
cific areas as individual property management 
and investment trusts.
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                                            Moreover, the unstable financial situation                          reover,  stable ancial tuation that 
                          existed at the end of 1997 had forced some Japa-
                        nese banks into bankruptcy and threatened the 
                         viability of others . Internationally powerful
                          Western banks purchased weak Japanese banks
                          on good terms and used their acquisitions to ex-
                          pand and strengthen operations in Japan. For 
                         example, Ripple Wood Holdings took over the 
                          Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., and Mer-
                        rill Lynch Securities bought bankrupt Yamaichi
                        Securities to acquire the latter's sales network
                           and clients . On the other hand , some belea-
                        guered Japanese financial institutions have ac-
                          tively sought out foreign capital to increase
                        their capital and fortify their financial standing
                           by making use of foreign companies' funds, ex-
                           cellent know-how, and brand name recognition.
                            Japan's service industry (e.g., retail and dis-
                         tribution) , once protected by competition-stifling
                         regulation, is also being called on to deregulate 
                      and open itself up. Service-industry capital over-
                           seas sees Japan as an inviting market that
                          promises growth. 
                            With the information revolution now in full 
                         swing in Japan, Western information and tele-
                          communications companies are eyeing the Japa-
                          nese market as some Japanese information and
                          telecommunications companies are forming alli-
                          ances with foreign companies to acquire funding 
                         and technology. Promoting this inflow of foreign 
                     capital are the overlapping objectives of Japa-
                         nese and foreign capital seeking to enter the 
                         field of computer-related services. 
                         5. Conclusions 
                           Does foreign capital help Japan recover its in-
                         ternational competitiveness? Does it help create 
                           jobs or–because restructuring must occur first–
                        increase unemployment ? Will American-style 
                        management take root in Japan? There are nu-
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merous fears concerning the entry of foreign 
capital into Japan, one being whether Japanese 
companies will be hastily discarded if alliances 
with foreign capital go sour. 
  Japan needs positive structural reform and 
must create a competitive market through de-
regulation. Although the entry of foreign capital 
creates competition , a business world accus-
tomed to government protection may attempt 
to protect its vested interests by opposing de-
regulation and the entry of foreign capital. Fur-
thermore, there still exist some regulations and 
Japanese business customs that deter the entry 
of foreign capital. 
  Given today's extensive transborder business 
activity, the economic role of the nation has de-
clined in relative terms. Entry of foreign capital 
is now bilaterally accepted between nations. In-
deed, this is an age in which foreign capital is 
actively used to develop a nation's economy. 
 Japan must view foreign capital as a means of 
actively promoting restructuring and regenera-
tion. Japanese companies must utilize the mana-
gerial resources and technology of foreign com-
panies. Rather than passively accepting foreign 
capital, Japan must actively invite it as a means 
of revitalizing the Japanese economy. Further 
deregulation and the adoption of global standard 
by business are also urgent issues. 
  Japanese-style management and business cus-
toms such as lifetime employment and the sen-
iority system were once thought as the strength 
of Japanese business but are now seen as 
sources of inefficiency. Yet, rather than com-
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pletely rejecting Japanese-style management, it 
is necessary to determine which aspects should 
be reevaluated and which should be retained. 
Japan must not depend completely on foreign 
capital, but rather must identify and domesti-
cally adopt the advantageous aspects of foreign 
capital while rejecting the negative ones. 
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